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Abstract: Professionalism and bureaucracy tend to be understood as incompatible 
systems of work organization, represented by the ideals of collegiality and auton-
omy versus control and supervision. I present a historical case study from early 
20th century Norway examining the potential clash between efforts made toward 
professionalization and bureaucratization in industry. Based on my findings, I argue 
that there is neither an inherent conflict between professionalism and bureaucracy 
nor static national trajectories at the level of professional versus bureaucratic work 
organization.   
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For a long time, theories on professions brought forth the contention of an inherent 
conflict between professionalism and bureaucracy, contributing to a division 
between the sociology of professions and organizations. During the past decade, 
various scholars have contested both the argument of conflict and the fruitfulness 
of division (Bourgeault, Hirschkorn, & Sainsaulieu, 2011; Muzio & Kirkpatrick, 
2011; Evetts, 2010). Recent trends toward organizing the work of professions in 
large organizations and stronger monitoring of professions seem to have been 
major impulses underlying this shift, which in turn have inspired a rethinking of 
the issue of professional autonomy. 
Typically, professional autonomy is considered limited within organizations. 
New perspectives on professions and organizations depict organizations as assets 
to professional strategies (Suddaby & Viale, 2011). With this article, I wish to add 
a new dimension to the discussion of professional autonomy within organizations 
and, in so doing, bring attention to knowledge and the conditions of knowledge 
production. I present a historical case study of interrelations between the emer-
gence of large industrial corporations and engineering as a profession in Norway.   
Industry in Norway became increasingly based on science at the turn of the 20th 
century. This was particularly true in the chemical and electrometallurgical 
industries, industries in which a new type of industrial organization was developing. 
The established industries of textile and wood processing and their workshops were 
at a different level of technological complexity and scale of production. Devel-
opments in the natural sciences and the access to hydroelectric power paved the 
way for the new industries. The new businesses that developed created not only 
new opportunities but also challenges for Norwegian engineers.   
The introduction of the new industries was the work of engineers. The 
craftsman-like industrial organization of the past was insufficient for entry into 
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industries of higher technological complexity and for production of a larger scale. 
Engineers acted as mediators between natural science and business, and by fulfill-
ing this role, they opened up new industrial possibilities. Increased technological 
complexity and larger scale production were thus interconnected with the develop-
ment of the Norwegian engineering profession.  
One industrial enterprise in particular characterized the relationship between 
engineers and industry in Norway: Norsk Hydro (Hydro), a fertilizer company, 
became the first company to establish business successfully in an international 
market in the new industries. The success achieved by Hydro was first and 
foremost a heroic story of engineering; Hydro was founded on the research and 
development conducted by a group of engineers and scientists who created the 
world’s first artificial fertilizer production process. It seemed as if the industry and 
the engineering profession strengthened each other. 
 
 
Industrial espionage 
There was, however, a potential clash of interest between professionalization and 
industrialization. Industrial corporations in a capitalist economy tend to seek 
control of all their capital – including employees’ knowledge. The emerging 
engineering profession also sought to control its technological knowledge. During 
the interwar years, this potential clash of interest was triggered when a group of 
engineers was accused of industrial espionage by Hydro.  
These engineers were all former employees of Hydro and were all connected to 
a consultancy firm that specialized in providing services within Hydro’s branch of 
industry. When they were given the contract for the construction of a new factory 
in Poland, which was perceived as an exact duplication of Hydro’s, the suspicion 
of industrial espionage emerged. The accusations led to a decade of debate over the 
role of engineers in industrial companies: Who had intellectual property rights of 
knowledge derived from engineers’ work within industrial corporations? 
The immediate and direct cause of the conflict had its basis in the internal 
development of Hydro and the role of engineers in this company. This situation 
provided me an opportunity to analyse the conditions under which Norwegian 
engineers in industry were working during the first decades of the 20th century and 
how these conditions were changing in relation to industrial development and 
efforts made toward professionalization by engineers.  
The backdrop of this story is what often is referred to as the basic dilemma of 
engineers in industry – the balance between professional autonomy and corporate 
control. Although this idea originated from scholars studying American engineers 
(Layton, 1986), this dilemma seems to be a common challenge for engineers 
striving for unity and professionalization across national boundaries (Jakobsen, 
Andersen, Halvorsen, & Myklebust, 1998). This article attempts to uncover how 
this basic dilemma emerged in Norway and how engineers and industrialists 
responded to it. I argue that the issue arose as a result of transnational entangle-
ments of professionalism, economic organization, and knowledge production.  
The case presented here is based on a historical reconstruction of documents 
from three sources: legal documents from trials, internal documents from Hydro, 
and minutes from meetings of the Norwegian Engineering Society (NIF). In 
historical reconstruction, emphasis is placed on achieving insight and an 
understanding of particular events and actors on their premises, thereby making the 
contemporary context vital. Attention is driven toward a critical examination of the 
documents’ situation of origin and how this context can provide insight into 
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previous events and actors. For more detailed information on data and methods, see 
Nygaard (2003). 
This article, which is structured around the so-called basic dilemma of engineer-
ing, presents a discussion of different perspectives on the relationship between pro-
fessions and bureaucracy, with an emphasis on the engineering profession. To 
highlight differences between disciplinary and national interpretations of this 
relationship, I have chosen a narrative approach based on my historical case study 
on the engineers’ role in Hydro. Based on the findings of this case study, 
connections are made to German and American modes of industrial organization, 
as well as to Continental and Anglo-American theories on professionalism and 
bureaucratization. In my opinion, this case highlights the historical contingency of 
the relationship between professionalism and bureaucracy. 
I begin by presenting the discovery of what was perceived as industrial espion-
age. I then link the debate arising from these allegations to the so-called basic 
dilemma of engineers and its connection to theories on the relationship between 
professionalism and bureaucracy. Next I unravel the trajectories leading up to the 
judicial conflict between Hydro and its former engineers, which include entangle-
ments with German and American modes of industrial organization. Finally, the 
effects of the case and transnational entanglements are discussed in connection to 
the debates on professional autonomy and bureaucracy. 
 
 
Professionalism and bureaucracy 
It was by a coincidence that Hydro in 1930 uncovered what it called industrial 
espionage. When an apparatus document was misdirected to Hydro by an engineer 
from the workshop enterprise Kværner, Hydro’s leaders were surprised to learn 
that the document contained a drawing of an apparatus that was very similar to 
their most recently developed technology, which they thought had been kept secret. 
To their disappointment, they could confirm that the document was not intended 
for them but rather was meant for Emil Collett, an engineer and a former research 
manager at Hydro who, following his departure from Hydro, had founded a firm 
that specialized in consultancy work. The employees at his firm were all former 
Hydro engineers. Hydro learned that these engineers were contracted to establish a 
competing fertilizer factory in the city of Tarnów on assignment by the Polish 
government. Hydro’s leaders feared that this would be an exact duplication of their 
own factory.  
The engineers involved in this affair had previously worked at Hydro but were 
let go when a major reorganization occurred in the company during the 1920s. 
Hydro suspected that these engineers had kept their drawings and documents after 
they left the company and were now using them in their new positions. Based on 
this suspicion, Hydro accused the engineering consultants in 1931. A few days 
later, the office of Collett and his co-workers in Paris was raided by French police. 
During this raid, the police found documents from Hydro. Hydro’s managing 
director, Alex Aubert, later claimed that the volume of these documents was 
comparable to that in the firm’s archive.  
In court, Aubert delivered a dynamic speech in which he accused the engineers 
of national treason. Through their illegal use of Hydro’s secrets in competing 
companies’ services, they jeopardized the Norwegian economy and employment. 
This view was refuted by Thomas Chr. Hagemann, one of the accused. In an article, 
Hagemann (1932) argued that the real national traitor was Aubert. Through his 
position as the managing director of a company owned by international financial 
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capitalists, the French bank Paribas, and the Swedish Svenska Enskilda Banken, he 
served their claim for profit rather than Norwegian farmers’ need for fertilizer and 
Norwegian citizens’ need for food. As arguments were waged, the question of how 
knowledge production within industrial corporations should be organized was 
raised. Could the corporation demand property rights on knowledge derived from 
the individual efforts of engineers and restrict these engineers from using this 
knowledge elsewhere? 
Hagemann was an original among Norwegian engineers. In an earlier article, he 
argued for the destruction of Hydro’s monopolistic position as a fertilizer producer 
in Norway through the creation of farmer-owned fertilizer factories in every parish 
(Andersen & Yttri, 1997). The idea was probably inspired by Thorstein Veblen, a 
renowned American intellectual who forecasted the emergence of a “soviet of 
technicians” (Veblen, 1921). According to Veblen, the welfare and progress of 
American society called for engineers to take over the economic affairs from the 
“captains of industry”, or the vested interest, because they sabotaged production. 
The demand for profit, inherent in the capitalist system of ownership and 
finance, clashed with the productive potential of engineers’ knowledge and activity. 
Engineers’ loyalty to vested interests – not to citizens and society – was what 
constituted the problem with the organization of the American economy. Veblen 
called for engineers to release their altruistic potential by assuming a more 
autonomous role. His ideas have become a major reference point in research on 
engineering professions. Although Veblen’s normative approach and forecasts 
today are seen more as an anachronism, the basic dilemma of engineers, which he 
identified, continues to resonate.  
In his classic study of the history of American engineers,  Layton (1986) argued 
that Veblen misunderstood the basic dilemma. It was bureaucracy – not the vested 
interests or the capitalist organization of the economy as such – that hindered 
engineers’ activities. According to Layton, the pursuit of profit in business and the 
attempts by engineers to improve productivity through technological development 
were, in fact, compatible. Both business and engineering science profited as 
productivity improved. In addition, Layton argued that if a soviet of engineers were 
to emerge, it would not resolve the basic dilemma facing engineers. This basic 
dilemma involved the engineers’ position in bureaucratic organizations, private 
capitalist or government, and their ideal of becoming free professionals.  
By stressing the clash of organizational logics between bureaucracy and pro-
fessionalism, Layton highlighted an important tradition in the Anglo-American 
scholarly literature on professions. Despite great differences, the classical works by 
Talcott Parsons (1954), Margali Sarfatti Larson (1977),  Andrew Abbott (1988), 
and Eliot Freidson (2001) share the notion that professionalism in theory is a 
distinctly different type of work organization than bureaucracy. The core concept 
of the professions as a group of autonomous and free actors whose activities are 
organized around the principle of collegiality represents a central defining 
characteristic in the theory of professions in contrast to the hierarchical line and 
staff organization of bureaucracy.  
These ideal-typical understandings of the professions led Conze and Kocka 
(1985), two German historians, to deny the existence of professions in 19th-century 
Germany. Because the academic workers in Germany were not free professionals, 
but sought work and recognition within state bureaucracies, Conze and Kocka 
launched the concept of Bildungsbürgertum as an alternative to professions. Their 
focus on the interconnections among academically based occupations, the state, 
and national cultural trajectories was part of a critical historical-sociological 
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appropriation of the theory on professions in Europe around 1990. Based on 
historical evidence, scholars rejected the theoretical claim of an inherent conflict 
between professionalism and bureaucracy (Torstendahl, 1991; Torstendahl & 
Burrage, 1990). 
This description bears resemblance with those given in studies on the 
professional history of engineers. The studies of Layton (1986) and  Gispen (1989) 
provide analyses where professionalism is more contested from corporate control 
in the United States. This feature is often explained in relation to national cultural 
trajectories. Industrial organization and engineering activities in Germany are 
structured around Bildung and the welfare of state and society, whereas 
managerialism and corporations’ ability to maximize profit are depicted as the 
American way of organizing engineering activities. This pattern deviates from the 
more general portraits in the literature on professions, where the United States 
represents professionalism and Germany represents bureaucracy as the main ideals 
of work organization. As Gispen (1988) has shown, these differences may 
primarily be caused by different theoretical and analytical perspectives. 
By comparing the national trajectories of European modernization, both the 
Bielefeld and the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences 
(SCASSS) research projects tried to determine the role and degree of 
professionalism in the investigated nations’ histories. This Sonderweg approach 
obscured scholars’ attention to the entanglements of professional, organizational, 
and political ideas across national boundaries. Accounting for both national 
trajectories and the transnational environment ideas on professionalism, knowledge 
diffusion, and institutional solutions have always been developed within, I find it 
easier to understand the historical contingency of the relationship between 
professionalism and bureaucracy (Bauerkämper, 2009). 
The actors and events that shaped the development of Norwegian industry and 
engineering as a profession were not limited by national boundaries but rather were 
entangled in a transnational context of work, knowledge, and organizational 
diffusion. Hydro and engineers in Norway were influenced by both German and 
American ways of organizing engineering activities. The entanglements involving 
Hydro and German and American industrial corporations and their engineers 
provides a case in which the usual ways of portraying differences between 
Germany and the United States in the literature on professions and economic 
history are challenged. The diffusion of knowledge and organization across 
national boundaries caused an amalgamation of ideas and solutions, which 
transformed and restructured the original features in such a manner that claiming 
an inherent conflict between professionalism and bureaucracy seems to be an 
unsatisfactory perspective.  
 
 
From consultant to employee – the rise of big business 
The balance between business loyalty and engineers’ role as free professionals was 
the essence of the judicial conflict between Hydro and its former engineers. 
Entering an unlegislated field of justice in Norway, this case had great principal 
importance and initiated a debate on the role of engineers in business. As a 
consequence of the advent of chemical and electrometallurgical industries, more 
science-based and complex technologies, and larger scale of production, the 
engineering occupation underwent changes during the interwar years in Norway. 
On the one hand, this development made engineering the dominant profession in 
business (Benum, 1975). On the other hand, the most common position for an 
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engineer was in the transition from engineering consultant to full-time employee 
(Halvorsen, 1994).  
Consultancy work was the main activity among Norwegian engineers at the turn 
of the 20th century, irrespective of positions in industrial companies, colleges, or 
government agencies (Børresen, 1991). Through this organization of engineering 
activity, engineers were very much in control of their knowledge and work con-
ditions. Before each assignment, engineers and their clients – it did not matter 
whether the clients were industrial companies or government agencies – negotiated 
which task to tackle and under what conditions. With each contract, engineers 
gained experience in various fields and were able to apply the knowledge they had 
acquired while serving clients in future assignments. 
A group of highly educated engineers became the main architects as new 
industries emerged at the turn of the 20th century. The top candidates from the elite 
engineering colleges of Germany gathered around Sam Eyde, an engineer who had 
established an engineering consultancy firm in Norway (Sogner, 2003; Grimnes, 
2001). Eyde’s firm was originally a traditional engineering consultancy business 
that contracted the building of railway stations and bridges and provided expertise 
to various companies experiencing technical problems. This changed as he gained 
property control of several of the large waterfalls in Norway. These resources were 
ideal assets for gaining entry to the industries of chemical and electrometallurgical 
production. 
Several attempts at establishing industrial ventures were made by this group of 
engineers, with some failing and others succeeding (Sogner, 2003). Fertilizer 
production was one such venture that really took off. In cooperation with Kristian 
Birkeland, a leading physicist, Eyde developed the world’s first industrial method 
of artificial fertilizer production. With the help of investments from Svenska 
Enskilda Banken and the French bank Paribas, Hydro was established in 1905. 
Hydro’s mode of production highlighted the new organization of engineering 
work that was emerging in the new industries. Because the technical services of 
engineering consultants were insufficient to develop, manage, and maintain this 
mode of production. Hydro solved this problem by employing a staff of full-time, 
salaried engineers (Andersen, 2005). These engineers were given tasks according 
to which units in the organization they belonged. Based on the engineers’ activities 
during the first two decades, the transition from consultancy work to employee 
seemed to have been relatively smooth. One of the terms of appointment made it 
clear that there were no limits to engaging in consultancy work. The inclusion of 
this clause raises the following question: Why were engineers in a full-time 
position allowed to have such a clause in their terms of appointment? 
Hydro’s first years of operation constituted its pioneering phase, with constant 
tests of the production and the organization. Thus, the engineers who were full-
time employees enjoyed vast freedom in their activities, from which a corporate 
culture dominated by autonomous engineers grew. This type of corporate culture 
suited the pioneering years of Hydro and its group of elite engineers. The engineers 
continued to plan and do consultancy work in other business ventures. These 
activities were profitable for not only the engineers but also Hydro. While visiting 
other industrial projects, the engineers acquired knowledge useful for making 
advancements in Hydro’s fertilizer production and factory building (Andersen, 
2005). 
The freedom to engage in other businesses and the openness among industrial 
companies resulted in the thriving development of industrial projects in the 
chemical and electrometallurgical industries during the two first decades of the 
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20th century in Norway. An important feature of the open industrial environment 
was obviously the personal connections being forged among young, aspiring 
engineers who were educated at elite technical colleges in Germany. It is important 
to stress that the freedom to operate beyond company borders was not a new 
feature in Norwegian business. The mobile and autonomous engineering role 
merely continued the engineering tradition that had been established through 
consultancy work. This feature of organizing engineers’ work bears strong 
resemblance to the ideal-typical notion of the free professional. However, during 
the interwar years, forces emerged to overthrow the ideal of autonomy for 
engineers in full-time positions at industrial enterprises. 
 
 
Economic crisis and international markets  
The economic growth and ventures of the 1910s were replaced by stagnation and 
recurring economic crises during the 1920s in Norway. The economic circum-
stances put the brakes on the development of further industrial projects and, thus, 
contributed to decreasing the market for consultancy work. In addition, companies 
struggling to cope with the economic crises became less interested in making 
investments in research and development. Instead of employing staffs of engineers 
to develop their own technologies, companies once again started acquiring licenses 
from internationally established corporations (Sejersted, 1993).  
The industry’s decreasing demand for engineering activities coincided with an 
increase in the number of engineers in Norway (i.e., graduates from the Norwegian 
Institute of Technology started entering the labour market at this point in time). 
Facing unemployment, many traveled abroad, chiefly to the United States (Lange, 
1988). NIF feared this development would diminish the engineering profession’s 
status, and debated whether the increasing numbers of engineers in official 
positions threatened the status of engineers as free professionals (Halvorsen, 1994).  
These concerns likely stemmed from events taking place in Germany, where 
industrial development was far more advanced. German industrial corporations 
were larger, more complex, and better organized than their Norwegian counterparts. 
These corporations generally used more advanced technologies, and their mode of 
production was larger in both scale and scope (Chandler & Hikino, 1990). At this 
point in history, the degree of industrial organization represented the greatest 
difference between Norway and Germany. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
there was a strong coordination of industrial activities through investment banks 
and cartels in Germany (Chandler & Hikino, 1990), a feature that barely existed in 
Norway (Sejersted, 1993). 
The strong cooperation and organization of German industrial activities created 
an autonomous engineering culture within the bureaucracies that were created. At 
the same time, mechanisms were established to monitor and control subcontractors 
and international business partners. As I have previously mentioned, these meas-
ures of corporate control were non-existent in Norwegian industry before the 1930s. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, however, corporate control was even more wide-
spread than in Germany. In Chandler’s (1990) vocabulary the difference between 
German and American industrial organization were “organized” and “competitive” 
managerial capitalism. Accordingly, the competitive environment of industrial 
business in the United States led to stronger monitoring of engineering activities 
within the organizations than in Germany. 
The ideal of the autonomous engineer in industry was contested at Hydro during 
the 1920s. Blinded by their success, engineers in leading positions failed to 
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monitor the technological advancements being made internationally and to foresee 
the emergence of business cooperation among the large chemical corporations in 
Germany. By 1920, the German company BASF had developed a superior technol-
ogy to Hydro’s fertilizer production process. In addition, the major chemical 
companies, including BASF, were about to set up a trust that would dominate the 
international fertilizer market. Because of their lack of attention to these 
developments, the managers at Hydro found themselves in a critical situation in the 
mid-1920s. The future of Hydro rested on its ability to make a successful transition 
to an improved technology and to consolidate its market position (Andersen, 2005). 
As Hydro’s owners and managers evaluated the situation, attention was drawn 
to the autonomous engineering culture that characterized the pioneering years. 
Although the company clearly benefited from this culture during the early years of 
development, the lack of organization and control of the engineering officials’ 
work seemed less suitable as it attempted to return to business as usual. Moreover, 
there were growing concerns as to whether the engineers possessed the level of 
competence required for them to remain in charge of all functions in a modern 
international business. The affairs of Hydro involved complex actions that were of 
both economic and legal nature. When the company’s future plans were laid in 
1925, it became obvious that a major reorganization was needed—that is, the 
engineers’ position and the autonomous role they had enjoyed would be 
reconsidered. To uncover these changes that occurred after 1925, I focus on 
Collett’s career in the following sections. This prime suspect of industrial 
espionage highlighted how the engineers’ autonomy at Hydro changed during these 
years of reorganization. 
 
 
Comparing American and German cooperation 
In 1925, Aubert was appointed as the new general manager at Hydro. Aubert had 
not previously worked at Hydro, which was perceived as a prerequisite for 
changing the corporate culture of autonomous engineers. The most urgent tasks to 
tackle were finding ways to obtain new technology and to gain access to 
international markets. Two options were considered: one American, the other 
German.  
In its pursuit of options for obtaining new technology, Hydro hired Collett. He 
filled a temporary position as research manager. During his search for techno-
logical solutions, he visited the United States, where he was introduced to a new 
way of organizing technological development that would later inspire him. 
Nitrogen Engineering Corporation (NEC), a chemical engineering group, was an 
American engineering consultancy firm that differed from traditional consultancy 
firms in Norway in that it specialized in one branch of the industry and offered 
total technological assistance (Andersen & Yttri, 1997). It had developed a new 
fertilizer technology with the potential to compete with the German alternative. 
In Germany, BASF was integrated into the chemical giant Interessengemein-
schaft Farbenindustrie (IG Farben). The alliance of German chemical companies 
was the patentee of the most effective fertilizer technology and controlled, through 
its leadership in the international cartel, the fertilizer market. IG Farben, which 
dominated the chemical industry in Germany, was renowned for its widespread use 
of patents and legal restrictions on subcontractors so as to prevent knowledge of its 
technology from leaking. At this point in time, the industrial corporations in 
Europe, in general, did most of the research and development of technology 
themselves (Andersen, 2005).  
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Collett entered an industrial environment that was similar, in the sense of 
openness and the diffusion of technical knowledge, to that of the pioneering years 
before and during the First World War in Norway. NEC was an autonomous 
organization and contracted consultancy services within the competitive industrial 
market in the United States. The role of NEC as a technological developer 
contrasted with the conditions in Germany. The conditions of knowledge diffusion 
in Norway were, however, more in line with the American style of openness than 
the strict control that characterized conditions in Germany. The relatively small 
engineering community in Norway interacted closely with one another, and the 
boundaries among the various industrial enterprises were not absolute. 
However, Hydro and Aubert were not eager to ensure autonomy for its 
engineers. The corporation viewed its operations in the international market as an 
opportunity to hunt for new technologies and partnerships. In this respect, IG 
Farben was far more attractive than NEC. In 1927, Hydro and IG Farben signed an 
agreement in which Hydro obtained access to technologies and markets and IG 
Farben received shares and a position on Hydro’s board (Andersen, 2005).  
As part of the 1927 agreement, IG Farben presented several organizational 
demands. An important part of these demands involved the conditions of engineer-
ing officials. The Germans were especially preoccupied with arrangements to 
prevent the leakage of technological knowledge. They demanded that all 
engineering officials at Hydro receive and sign the new terms of appointment. Two 
arrangements involving these terms were new to Norwegian industry. First, the 
engineers were obligated to maintain extensive secrecy, in the Norwegian sense; 
these rules applied to communication even between engineers working in different 
units within the company. Second, all engineers were bound to a quarantine of 2 
years if they transferred to a competing company (Nygaard, 2003).  
These arrangements were perhaps suitable in German industry, but the use of 
extensive control and the restriction of communication and mobility were 
unfamiliar in Norwegian business. Another aspect was the relatively small 
industrial milieu in Norway. The engineers and industrialists knew each other very 
well, both formally and informally. They met at functions, parties, and restaurants, 
and participated in bridge evenings together. It was obviously a giant challenge for 
engineers and industrialists to refrain from mentioning business matters on these 
occasions. Thus, the influence from Germany led to more corporate control of 
Norwegian engineers at Hydro. By contrast, if Hydro had cooperated with NEC, 
less corporate control would have resulted. One person in particular was affected 
by the new conditions of appointment for engineering officials at Hydro. 
 
 
Was it industrial espionage? 
When Hydro’s quest for new technology ended, it no longer needed the services of 
Collett. In fact, he was one of the first to be laid off by Aubert during the 
company’s reorganization. At this point, Collett resumed his consultancy work 
with new inspiration. Collett tried to set up his consultancy activities in line with 
those of NEC by offering total technical solutions within the chemical industries. 
This was a new venture in Norway, but the industrial and financial situation was 
not suitable for this line of business in the 1920s.  
Those few companies operating in the chemical industries were struggling and 
not capable of making investments in technology. There hardly existed the 
financial capability in Norway to invest in the capital-intensive industries to which 
Collett aimed to provide services(Sejersted, 1993). Those companies were rather 
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inclined to obtain licenses internationally, as shown even in the case of Hydro. In 
an effort to promote his new consultancy work strategy successfully, Collett moved 
his business abroad and based his office in Paris. 
Using the connections he had made while working at Hydro, Collett went about 
selecting a team of highly competent engineers in the nitrogen processing industry. 
All his assistants were former employees at Hydro. However, when his firm 
managed to land its first major assignment, a contract with a fertilizer plant in 
Poland, he realized that he needed to hire additional employees. Suddenly, his 
attempts at hiring engineers from Hydro became unsuccessful. Collett then turned 
to an old friend at Hydro, Julius Blich, who showed great interest in the matter. 
Blich felt snubbed when the manager position of the new plant at Herøya was not 
given to him. The Herøya plant was a giant investment, built with the new and 
improved German technology, and was thus the state of the art in fertilizer 
production. Collett was obviously eager to acquire assistance from engineers with 
experience at this plant. 
There were, however, obstacles of which Collett was unaware that interfered 
with his plans for hiring engineers from Hydro. The new conditions of appointment 
in the quarantine arrangement prohibited Hydro’s engineers from engaging in a 
competing company’s activities for 2 years. This arrangement frustrated Blich, 
who felt that his opportunities of further career advancement at Hydro were 
diminishing and that he was being denied the possibility to pursue opportunities 
elsewhere. During the course of a year, Collett and Blich met several times and 
discussed Blich’s prospects of joining Collett’s firm. However, Blich hesitated 
during the final steps of negotiation. He made contact with the engineering society, 
where he requested a principal and legal evaluation of the new terms of 
appointment at Hydro. Before Blich received an answer from the engineering 
society, Hydro acted on the suspicion that Collett’s affairs were dubious. These 
steps resulted in two accusations of industrial espionage being put forth in the 
Norwegian legal system against the engineers Hagemann and Blich at Hydro’s 
behest.  
The trials consisted of two parts. First, Hagemann was charged; he was 
allegedly the one who had brought the apparatus document from Hydro to Collett. 
During the building of the new factory at Herøya, Hagemann received a short-term 
appointment at Hydro and became a member of the team that originally designed 
the key apparatus.   
In his defense, Hagemann claimed that he had not taken any of Hydro’s 
documents—only his own notes—when he left Hydro to join Collett. While 
working at Hydro, he had tried to design his own improved version of the 
apparatus in his spare time in hopes of getting it patented. These notes and his 
experiences formed the foundation of his apparatus design for Collett. He claimed 
that it would be impossible for engineers to suppress their knowledge—even 
knowledge deemed to be secret—because all experiences combined together in 
their minds and formed their technical know-how. It weakened Hydro’s case 
severely that Hagemann did not receive the new letters of appointment and, thus, 
did not have a quarantine clause. The attorney-general gave Hagemann the benefit 
of the doubt and decided not to pursue the case against Hagemann further from the 
District Court.  
Second, Blich put Hydro on trial, accusing the company of unjustly firing him. 
Hydro argued that Blich had leaked secret information about its production 
processes to Collett during their talks. One witness, a Hydro official subordinate to 
Blich, claimed that Blich had told him about one meeting with Collett; the 
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conversation between the Hydro official and Blich ended with Blich stating the 
following: “When I saw him [Collett] taking notes, I stopped talking” (Nygaard, 
2003).  Blich denied leaking any sensitive information from Hydro, claiming the 
right to commune with Collett. He also made the claim that his terms of appoint-
ment were too strict, pointing to the secrecy arrangements and the quarantine 
clause. This case went all the way to the Supreme Court of Norway, and Aubert 
became more and more anxious about the final outcome. 
Throughout the trials, it became obvious that the activities of Collett, although 
dubious, merely followed the pattern established at Hydro. The defeats in court 
were damaging not only to Aubert personally but also to Hydro’s standing in 
relation to IG Farben. He was preoccupied with protecting the quarantine 
arrangement, as the case against Blich was to be tried in the Supreme Court. First, 
he contacted one of the leading legal experts in this area in Norway, Professor 
Ragnar Knoph, and gave him the task of writing a legal evaluation of the new 
terms of appointment at Hydro. However, Knoph’s legal evaluation did not go in 
favor of Hydro, stating that both the codes of secrecy and the quarantine clause put 
unreasonable restrictions on the engineers’ professional freedom.  
In the case against Hagemann, the defeat was complete for Hydro. For making 
the accusation, Hydro was ordered to provide a substantial compensation to 
Hagemann. In the case against Blich, the ruling was unclear. Firing him was 
considered somehow legitimate but too harsh. However, the legal system was not 
the only arena that regulated the issue of professional autonomy versus corporate 
control during the 1930s. 
 
 
The standard agreement  
In 1930, NIF raised a proposal to establish a standard agreement for engineers. The 
proposal was put forth by its president, Claus Friman Dahl, another engineer who 
had been fired by Aubert in the late 1920s. As he launched his proposal to do so, he 
claimed that the society had received complaints about unfair terms of conditions 
from the society’s members and that these terms indicated a dangerous 
development that threatened the professional autonomy of engineers in Norwegian 
industry. Most likely the complaints to which he referred stemmed from Blich. The 
terms to which Friman Dahl referred when he raised the issue were similar to those 
of Blich. 
Discussions about engineers’ conditions in industrial companies were intricate 
because engineers dominated managing positions in Norwegian industry; NIF thus 
tried to avoid raising these issues so as to prevent schism and alienation of either 
managers or officials. The proposal to formulate a standard agreement did cause 
great controversy among the representatives of NIF. A fraction of managers at-
tempted to obstruct the proposal. Engineering officials were, however, very content 
with the society’s steps to promote their interests. Because the issue of standard 
agreement had been raised, engineers were finally confronted with a broad 
discussion on the conditions of engineering officials in industry. 
To obtain approval for the standard agreement among employers, NIF 
approached the employers’ association and proposed the formation of a joint 
committee that would establish the terms in the standard agreement. An interesting 
aspect of the cooperation between the organizations was that both organizations 
had engineers as members.  
One issue stood out as the most controversial: the quarantine arrangement. 
Among the members of the joint committee and the engineers, this arrangement 
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was seen as the most important issue. Addressing NIF’s members of the joint 
committee, the editor of Teknisk Ukeblad (Technical Weekly Magazine), Ø. Lange 
(1932), called their work the most important battle for the advancement of welfare 
and technology in the 20th century. Arguing that time was an important issue, 
Lange urged on the joint committee’s work. Lange’s appeal to the joint committee 
to finalize the agreement was a response to a particular event.  
The unlegislated situation gave the engineers an opportunity to influence the 
rule of law through the standard agreement. If the court ruling preceded the 
standard agreement, the conditions of engineering officials in industry would be 
determined by the legal profession – not by engineers. A court ruling would obvi-
ously set a precedent that would bind the joint committee. However, if the standard 
agreement was established before the trial ended, the court would have to take the 
agreement into account. 
The engineering officials were not alone in thinking along these lines. Fearing 
what the joint committee might promote, Hydro’s managing director, Aubert, paid 
close attention to its work. He was able to do so because Hydro’s sales manager, 
Sverre Brænne, was appointed a member of the joint committee. With experience 
in establishing the new letters of appointment at Hydro and in writing a memo for 
the employers’ association about the quarantine arrangement, Brænne not only 
represented Hydro’s interests but also possessed knowledge about the topic at hand. 
Brænne proved to be a key person in the joint committee’s work. He became the 
leader of the delegation of the employers’ association and used his influence to 
promote his company’s interests.  
 
 
Hydro sets the standard 
The internal affairs of Hydro were intimately involved in the formulation of the 
standard agreement. It is important to point out how much was at stake for Hydro 
regarding this issue. First, the revelation that its technology was being used at the 
new fertilizer factory in Poland was disastrous in light of the fact that Hydro’s new 
business partner was IG Farben, which controlled its sales internationally. Second, 
the new terms of appointment were part of that agreement, and, thus, it was 
important to protect both during the trials and in the standard agreement.  
Furthermore, the arrangements (i.e., ways in which to control engineering 
officials) were of particular interest to Hydro. In general, the remaining industrial 
enterprises in Norway did not have as sizable a staff of engineering officials, did 
not possess unpatented key technological processes, and, last but not least, did not 
have a business partner that defined specific organizational terms as IG Farben did 
(Sogner, 2003).  
Most of the Norwegian industrial enterprises seemed content with the 
traditionally autonomous role of engineers. There was good reason to feel this way. 
The openness and mobility among engineers, engineering colleges, workshops, and 
industrial companies provided good conditions for knowledge diffusion. Although 
technical knowledge was sometimes leaked to possible competitors, most com-
panies benefited from the advancements in technology that resulted from this 
openness. In the traditional industries of textile and wood processing and in the 
pioneering years of the chemical and electrometallurgical industries, this organiza-
tion of engineering activity worked well. However, as the complexity of technol-
ogy, scale and scope of production, and organizational size and bureaucratic level 
rose, attention shifted toward competition in an international market, which in turn 
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initiated a growing sense among employers that these developments called for 
more corporate control.  
The steps taken by Hydro’s owners and the new managing director represented 
a trend toward more corporate control over engineering officials in Norway. The 
employers’ association carried out an internal evaluation of the joint committee’s 
draft of the standard agreement. The evaluation revealed that other industrial 
enterprises were inspired by Hydro and that Hydro’s new letters of appointment 
were copied. “Not of current interest” was, however, the most common response 
among the members of the employers’ association to the strict secrecy arrange-
ments and quarantine clause embedded in the draft. The issue of strengthening 
corporate control over engineering officials proved to be of current interest only in 
large industrial corporations, in which the creation of technological processes or 
devices played a decisive role in the attainment of market position.  
Because the trials against the former Hydro engineers did not clearly state the 
legal status of Hydro’s new terms of appointment, Aubert focused his efforts on the 
joint committee. An analysis of the minutes of a meeting of the employers’ associ-
ation concerning the standard agreement reveals that Aubert and Hydro dominated 
the outcome of the standard agreement. According to the minutes, the quarantine 
clause represented the crux of the committee’s work. The representatives of NIF 
had made huge compromises in relation to this clause. Confronted with a 
quarantine time of a maximum period of three years, Brænne (Hydro’s manager) 
replied, “3 years, too short.” Given the choice of an open time limit, Brænne 
declared, “Aubert accepts” (Nygaard, 2003). 
Hydro lost these cases in court; however, its claims on the standard agreement 
were successful. Although the legal evaluation of the balance between professional 
autonomy and corporate control was critical to the new terms of appointment at 
Hydro, the measures of corporate control were introduced as the standard in 
Norway with the finalization of the standard agreement in 1938. With this standard 
agreement, Hydro had made its views on quarantine clauses and measures of 
corporate control legitimate. Not until after WW2 did the standard agreement 
affect other corporations’ use of similar measures, giving rise to the same tensions 
between engineers as officials and managers. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
What I earlier referred to as the basic dilemma of the engineering profession— 
autonomy versus corporate control—was hardly an issue in Norway before the 
introduction of new letters of appointment at Hydro, the Hydro trials, and the 
standard agreement for engineering officials. Ironically, the basic dilemma was 
introduced in Norway by the corporation that had served as a symbol of an autono-
mous engineering profession and its accomplishments. Hydro’s development to-
ward more corporate control was intertwined with local, national, and trans-
national tendencies.  
The crisis facing Hydro in the 1920s was partly perceived as a consequence of 
the autonomous engineering culture at the corporation, and its new managing 
director, Aubert, wanted more corporate control. Although Hydro and other 
Norwegian industrial corporations had not developed bureaucratic organizational 
structures similar to their German or American counterparts, the tendency toward 
more corporate control paved the way for a potential clash of interest between 
autonomy and business loyalty. One can only speculate if this potential would have 
been released without the allegations of industrial espionage.  
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As a result of technological and market-related shortcomings, Hydro sought an 
international partnership. When IG Farben was chosen, the control aspects were 
further strengthened. To some extent, the interconnections established with the 
German engineering culture and the introduction of corporate control are surprising. 
Drawing on the literature on professions and economic history, one might expect 
the control aspects to be stronger in the United States than in Germany. 
The organization of work and engineering activities in industrial organizations 
is portrayed as more subject to managerial control in the United States than in 
Germany. However, there are exceptions to this portrayal. The autonomy of 
engineers existed within German industries but not outside the boundaries of 
industrial cooperation. In the United States, it was the other way around. Within 
industrial corporations, strong corporate control challenged professionalism, 
whereas ventures (e.g., NEC) outside the boundaries of corporations could develop 
an autonomous engineering culture, benefiting from the competitive environment 
of American business.  
In my view, the historical case study presented here highlights the historical 
contingency of the relationship between professionalism and bureaucracy. Through 
its cooperation with a German corporation, Hydro was able to introduce measures 
more commonly used in American businesses because it operated outside the 
organized and coordinated German economic society. This finding indicates that 
there might not be an inherent conflict between professionalism and bureaucrat-
ization, nor static national trajectories in the degree and balance of professionalism 
and bureaucratic organization.  
As such, this case study underscores the recent shift in sociology contesting the 
assertion of an inherent conflict between professionalism and bureaucracy. As 
indicated at the beginning of this paper, scholars’ recent support for the 
reintegration of theories on professions and organizations seems to be prompted by 
contemporary developments in the organization of professional work. My 
historical case study suggests that analyses of interrelations between professions 
and organizations in the first half of the 20th century also benefit from abandoning 
the assumption of an inherent conflict between professionalism and bureaucracy. 
Thus, I wish to advocate a historical-sociological approach. Accounting for both 
the general patterns and the historical contingencies, I believe that both historical 
and social scientific analyses of professions and organizations will benefit. 
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